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Abstrak
Tulisan ini mencoba menganalisa dinamika proses negosiasi antara Pemerintah Filipina dan Front 
Pembebasan Islam Moro pada tahun 2001 sampai 2008. Secara khusus tulisan ini membahas tentang proses 
negosiasi pada aspek ancestral sebagai salah satu dari tiga aspek terakhir dalam Perjanjian Damai Tripoli 
tahun 2001 dengan menggunakan studi literatur. Berdasarkan teori kematangan (Zartman dan Faure, 2005), 
kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk melakukan perjanjian damai pada tahun 2008 karena keduanya menyadari 
berada dalam dua situasi; (1) Mutually Hurting Stalemate; dan (2) Mutually Enticing Opportunity. Kedua belah 
pihak sama-sama merasakan dampak buruk akibat konflik militer dan menyadari bahwa dengan melakukan 
negosiasi mereka akan mendapatkan keuntungan di masa depan. Mereka mencoba menghindari situasi 
catastrophe dan mencoba meraih beberapa keuntungan politik, sosial dan ekonomi dari dukungan pihak lokal 
dan internasional.
Kata kunci: Resolusi Konflik, Konflik Mindanao, MoA-AD, MILF, Negosiasi, Teori Kematangan
Abstract
This article tries to analyze the dynamic of negotiation processes between Government of Republic of 
Philippines (GRP) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) since 2001 until 2008. It will concern in the 
negotiation process toward the ancestral domain aspect as the last three major aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 
on Peace 2001 using literature studies. According to the ripeness theory (Zartman and Faure, 2005), GRP and 
MILF has been conducting negotiation for 2008 because both conflicting parties have realized the two situations
of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate and Mutually Enticing Opportunity. Both conflicting parties has shared the 
bad experience toward military fighting of Mindanao conflict and realize that by conducting a negotiation they 
can has expectation on the certain goals for the future. They try to avoid catastrophe situation and gain several 
benefit from local and international support in the term of politics, social and economic sphere. 
Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Mindanao Conflict, MoA-AD, Moro, MILF, Negotiation, Ripeness Theory.
Introduction
Mindanao conflict has happened in 
many years ago. It is not a simple form of 
rebellion movement toward official 
Philippines government. Mindanao conflict 
has covered about self-identity and the 
independence of a nation from Moslem 
Mindanao. Before the arrivals of Spain 
colonize, Mindanao Island was governed 
by Sultan. They practiced Islamic value for 
governing their politics and social-
economic life. The expansion of Spain 
colonize around 1521 has stimulated the 
erupted of conflict. The Moslem Mindanao 
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fought against colonizer who tries to 
subjugate Mindanao Island become Roman 
Catholicism as well as Luzon and Visayas 
Island of Philippines. The failure of Spain 
colonizer did not end the conflict of 
Mindanao Conflict. In 1898, under the 
Treaty of Paris, USA came as new 
colonize and successful in integrating 
Mindanao as part of Philippines territorial 
integration. Although American colonies 
used the different approach by using 
political manipulation toward Moslem 
Mindanao, they still in an effort to change 
the mainstream of that population into 
Filipino’s mainstream. The creation new 
law of the land and the migration of 
Christian population from North into South 
have made the marginalization of Moslem 
Mindanao and the indigenous population 
of Mindanao Island. The continuation of 
that policy by Philippines government after 
the independent has led the emerging of 
the resistance movements from Moslem 
Mindanao. 
According to Matuan (2004), there are 
several issues that constitute the Mindanao 
problem, namely;
1) Poverty, inequality, and 
environmental destruction; 2) Political 
corruption; 3) Negative image held by
Christians, Moro, and Lumad peoples of 
each other; 4) Failure of the national 
government to integrate Moro peoples into 
national Filipino identity; 5) The economic 
exploitation of Mindanao’s resources and 
the migration of Filipino form the north 
that led to loss of ancestral lands; 6) The 
Moro struggle for self-rule
Another opinion has been delivered by 
Quevedo (2004), in his recent article; he 
mentioned four main roots of conflict 
integrated into Philippine government as 
follows;
1) Poverty, integrated with low 
productivity, criminality, marginalization, 
and environmental degradation; 2) 
Ignorance, it was caused by poor school 
and education; 3) Disease, including 
malnutrition and poor access to health 
services; 4) Injustice, human right 
violation, land conflict, graft, and 
corruption. 
These issues have significant factors that 
have caused the emerging effort from 
Mindanao people, especially for 
Bangsamoro to get their independence 
form, Philippine.  Poverty, inequality and 
environment destruction which are done by 
the regime or government make 
Bangsamoro people take the action in 
strengthening position its to rebel the
government. Social injustice, economic 
exploitation, unequal developments have 
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contributed to the factor of emerging the 
conflict between government and Moros 
people. These factors have contributed to 
the complexity of Moro problems, from 
the primordial conflict it has been shaped 
by instrumental conflict and finally, the 
Mindanao conflict has reached a stage of 
the constructivist conflict.
The standard bearer of Moro font has 
been initialed by the emerging of Moro 
National Liberation Movement (MNLF) 
under Nur Misuari command in 1969. In 
progress, GRP and MNLF conducted 
negotiation stage and brought agreement 
namely the Final Peace Agreement in 
1996. It assumed as the final agreement for 
solving the Mindanao conflict. 
Nevertheless, the FPA in 1996 has failed to 
end the conflict. It becomes a momentum 
for the emerging new resistance movement 
among Moslem Mindanao. 
The new standard bearer of Moro front 
has been replaced by the establishment of 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
in 1976. It uses Islamic ideology as its 
basic ideology of the movement. MILF has 
objectives to formulate the Islamic 
independent state of Moslem Mindanao. At 
the beginning, MILF ha organize guerilla 
warfare strategy for dealing with 
Philippines government. It has responsible 
for several bombing attack and military 
action against Philippines government.  
The strategic has shaped into semi-
conventional warfare. MILF has 
established the shadow government on 
Mindanao Island. It becomes a form of 
political-military organization by 
establishing its Political Committee Sets-
ups from the central until Barangay  level. 
It has aimed to replace the existing of 
Philippines government officers in 
Mindanao Island. In progress, initiated by 
Ramos government and Estrada’s 
governance afterward, during 1997 until 
2000 both parties had conducted the 
negotiation without third parties invitation. 
During that years, GRP and MILF have 
concerned on the issue of the ceasefire 
agreement and dismissed the hostilities 
among them. In 2001, under the President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration, 
GRP and MILF has been conducting 
negotiation by inviting Malaysia as the 
third parties facilitator. It becomes a 
momentum for MILF to be a legal 
representative and new standard bearer of 
the Moro front. Soliman has categorized 
the processes of peace talk between GRP 
and MILF into two terms namely 
“domestic stage” in 1997-2000 and 
“diplomatic stage” in 2001- present. The 
ongoing processes of peace talk between 
GRP and MILF cannot deny from the 
erupted of arm conflict and hostilities 
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between them. After the heavy aggregation 
from GRP to Moslem village in Buliok in 
2003 with the aim to capture the MILF 
headquarter in Buliok complex. Both 
conflicting parties have decided to 
continue the peace talk on the issue of the 
ancestral domain for 2008. It becomes a 
big question, why GRP and MILF still 
continue the peace talk although many 
agreements have failed to solve Mindanao 
conflict. 
According to the ripeness theory 
(Zartman and Faure, 2005), both 
conflicting parties will conduct negotiation 
because they are in certain conditions and 
states that negotiation will be achieved if 
the conflict has reached on the high stage 
of tension but before reaching capitulate 
condition. Capitulate means there is an 
unequal level of actors. It will be difficult 
even impossible to conduct any negotiation 
among conflicting parties. He makes 
simple explanation by categorizing the 
condition into two terms of a condition 
which becomes the concept to explain why 
conflicting parties finally use negotiation 
for solving their conflict. Zartman and 
Faure (2005 p. 272) describe:
…a ripe moment is depicted as a 
“mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS), 
which is characterized by a deadlock. The 
parties are locked into a situation because 
of an impending catastrophe. In this 
situation, the disputing parties come 
recognize, through a cost-benefit 
calculation, the sharp increase in the costs 
of further escalation, which limits the use 
of unilateral strategies and enhances the 
prospect of a negotiated settlement as the 
only way out of an escalating situation. 
“Another way to conceptualize a ripe 
moment is as “mutually enticing 
opportunity” (MEO), which is distinguish 
from an MHS by its emphasis on future 
gains rather than on costs. During a ripe 
moment, the parties begin to negotiate 
because they expect to achieve certain 
goals using alternative strategies instead of 
conflict”. 
Based on those concepts, worse 
situation toward conflict settlement by 
using military approach leads both parties 
to conduct peaceful settlement in resolving 
Moro’s conflict. Both parties have shared 
the common sense of disadvantages from 
arms conflict. The major wars on 2000 and 
2003 did not give benefit for both 
conflicting parties. Degradation of 
economic development regarding 
government’s arms policy or military 
attack against MILF become one of the 
considerations which must be thought 
deeply by GRP. It also supported by 
infrastructures destruction, unbeneficial 
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impact on physical and psychological that 
have pushed both parties for conducting 
the negotiation as a possible way to settle 
their dispute. The continuation of military 
force with GRP will harm the MILF’s 
image and credibility as a liberation 
movement for representing the 
Bangsamoro’s demand to the national and 
international world. GRP and MILF also 
rethink about beneficial impacts they can 
get if they want to conduct negotiation for 
settling the conflicts even from domestic 
and international society such as OIC, 
Malaysia, the World Bank, the United 
State of America, Japan, and other 
international actors.
The Dynamic of Mindanao Peace 
Processes in 2001-2008
On March 24, 2001, both parties 
signed the General Framework for the 
Resumption of Peace Talk between GRP 
and MILF in Kuala Lumpur. It was 
regarded as Framework Agreement and as 
the open time of diplomatic stage for GRP 
and MILF to settle Mindanao conflict. This 
was the first agreement signed since 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo turned 
in her power on January 20, 2001. It has 
been followed by several agreements in 
GRP-MILF peace processes. The great 
agreement around that year was the signing 
of Tripoli Agreement on Peace between 
GRP and MILF on June 22, 2001, in 
Tripoli pointing out three clusters to be 
negotiated for next step: security aspect, 
relief, and rehabilitation (refer to 
humanitarian aid and development aspect), 
and ancestral domain. It was guided by 
several agreements for implementing the 
three points from Tripoli Agreement in 
2001. In august 2001 at Putrajaya, 
Malaysia both conflicting parties has 
signed an agreement on the first aspect of 
the Tripoli Agreement on Peace about 
security aspect that covered about the 
cessation of hostilities and security 
guarantees. It was followed by the signing 
of an agreement about the humanitarian, 
rehabilitation and development aspect as 
the second aspect of the TPA of 2001 
between GRP and MILF in May 2002 at 
Putrajaya, Malaysia. However, again, those 
agreements cannot decline the tension 
between GRP and MILF; Arroyo had 
ordered the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) to attack MILF in 
Buliok complex in North Cotabato and 
Maguindanao on February 11, 2003. This 
command made the conflict erupted again 
with three weeks fighting. 
On March 2003, both parties 
continued the negotiation process and held 
several meetings discussing peaceful 
settlement between GRP and MILF and the 
last three points of Tripoli Peace 
140 Fajriyah Nurkhasanah Taufik | DAULIYAH Journal
Agreement (TPA) in 2001 become the 
most attractive issue for both parties. In 
2004, both conflicting parties initiated the 
formation of the International Monitoring 
Team (IMT) with Malaysia as the leader. 
Finally, both conflicting parties have 
agreed on the Memorandum of Agreement 
on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) after the 
long road of mapping draft the last three 
major point of the TPA since the last 2003 
until 2008. It was scheduled on August 5, 
2008, and predicted become a key for 
solving Moro problems and settle the 
Southern Philippines conflict. It covers 
three main issues: Ancestral Domain, 
peace, and natural resource right within the 
newly designated Moro territory (Wilson,
2009).      
The processes of peace talk between 
GRP and MILF about ancestral domain has 
been influenced by the existing of hawkish 
groups  from outside and inside both 
parties. They tend to continue using 
military action to deal the Mindanao 
conflict and do not support the promoting 
peaceful settlement. The potential spoilers 
within the peace talk come from local and 
national officers of Philippines 
government. The Philippines constitution 
never supports the demand from MILF as 
well as Bangsamoro people. It has been 
claimed to threaten the national security 
and integration. Arm Force of Philippines 
based on that constitution has used military 
offensive to battle with MILF. The 
oligarch from Mindanao and Manila has 
been informed as the potential spoilers 
within peace processes for 2008. The local 
officer of one province from Mindanao 
Island strongly refused the processes of 
peace talk on the issue of ancestral domain 
aspect is North Cotabato Governor 
Emmanuel Pinol. According to ICG report, 
he has been supported by several
Governors they are Zamboanga City 
Mayor Celso Lobregat and former mayor 
of Carmen, North Cotabato Roger Tolino.
“….The Supreme Court, Congress, and 
local government executives are not on board 
the peace process. Worse, Arroyo is still the 
indecisive president.” (Luwaran.com, 2009) 
The potential spoilers also exist in 
MILF’s body. ICG has reported that there 
were any “renegade” who prefer to war 
rather than peace talk. The splinter 
Commander of MILF has been reported 
responsible for bombing action during the 
ARMM governor election. From outside 
both conflicting parties, the hawkish group 
has been represented by the existing of 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Lumad 
population. Renegade from MILF has been 
suspected open relationship with ASG for 
conducting terrorism action. The Ancestral 
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domain is the great issue for the Lumad 
tribes who are the indigenous people of 
Mindanao Island. They tend to become a 
potential spoiler when the agreement just 
for Moslem population and assumed as 
threatened for Lumad itself. 
Beside that, the dove groups  also exist 
within GRP and MILF peace talk 
processes. They support on the promoting 
peaceful settlement for Mindanao conflict. 
It does not just come from local but also 
from the international community. They 
have strong commitment to supporting the 
peaceful settlement in Mindanao. Several 
Islamic states such Malaysia, Libya, 
Indonesia etc have offered its contribution 
for creating reconciliation toward 
Mindanao conflict. The financial aid and 
development project also comes from
America, Japan, World Bank, ADB and 
other international community.
The Causal Factors of Negotiation Stage 
for Settle Mindanao Conflict of 2008
GRP and MILF have been conducting 
several negotiations and signing several 
agreements since 1997 until 2008. The 
great stage of the negotiation process 
between GRP and MILF are under Arroyo 
administration because in her era of 
governmental administration MILF has 
known as the legal representative of 
Bangsamoro demand which replace the 
existing of MNLF after the signed of FPA 
in 1996 as the Moro front. Although MILF 
has done several peace talk with previous 
Philippines President since 1997 as 
mentioned by Soliman under the Arroyo 
administration MILF has a big chance and 
become the one of Moro front who has the 
opportunity to negotiate with the 
government. The momentum of peace talk 
between GRP and MILF under Arroyo 
administration is in 2001, 2003 and the 
recent peace talk in 2008. This fact 
becomes interesting topic to analyze why 
GRP and MILF still stand on the root of 
peace talk and resuming the negotiation for 
2008 although they have failed experience 
for settling Mindanao conflict through 
negotiation in 2001 and 2003. All know 
that the big influence from the hawkish 
groups also shaped the dynamic of the 
conflict. It becomes a question what is the 
consideration from both conflicting parties 
so that they still consistence for resuming 
peace talk toward Mindanao conflict 
settlement although the spoilers or hawkish 
groups around them and may threat their 
peace effort. 
The causal factors that influence the 
policy from both conflicting parties to 
settle the Mindanao conflict can be 
analyzed in term of two aspects of 
impulse; inside and outside the conflicting 
parties. The encouragement from inside 
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and outside had pursued GRP and MILF to 
any reconciliation toward their dispute. 
The government saw the big chance to 
conduct the negotiation with the new 
leader of MILF, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim 
who most secular than Salamt Hashim, 
hopefully, the negotiation between GRP 
and MILF could reach the final agreement 
for settle Mindanao conflict peacefully. 
GRP and MILF have begun for resuming 
the peace process after the Great War 
between them in 2003 by inviting third 
parties role through the creation 
International Monitoring Team (IMT). The 
IMT composed of Malaysia as the leader, 
Libya, Japan and Brunei as members.  The 
Mohagher Iqbal statement that negotiation 
as the best solution for settle the Mindanao 
conflict become the great chance to 
resuming the peace talk between GRP and 
MILF.
In August 2005, Mohagher Iqbal, 
MILF chief peace negotiator, reminded the 
Bangsamoro that the best way to solve the 
conflict in the region was through a 
negotiated political settlement. He argued 
that “resolving the problem through 
negotiation is bloodless and everybody is a 
winner.” (Taya, 2007)
Igbal’s statement has supported by the 
statement from MILF’s Vice Chairman, 
Ghadzali Jaafar, toward the peaceful 
settlement through negotiation between 
GRP and MILF, as reported (Cardona, 
2006):
“The MILF, on the other hand, seeks to 
have peace in Mindanao after 30 years of 
struggle”
GRP’s commitment to continue the 
peace talk process with MILF has clearly 
stated by Philippines President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, as reported:
“I welcome and support all peaceful, 
democratic and people-based consultations for 
peace and development. The nation gathers its 
strength from the diversity of ideas and 
aspirations channeled into effective 
democratic processes; and won on the 
negotiation table and not in the battlefield,”
(Koppin, 2005) 
Arroyo also delivered her statement toward 
the commitment to resume the peace talk 
with MILF for settling Mindanao conflict 
after her meeting with officials of the 
Cabinet Cluster on National Security on 
March 12, 2007, as follow  (Vitug, 2007): 
“I have decided to step up all measures to 
enforce the law, preserve the atmosphere of 
peace and stability, and advance the ongoing 
peace talks between the GRP (Government of 
Republic of Philippines) and the MILF.”
The conflicting parties have a strong 
commitment to implementing the ceasefire 
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agreement and dismissed their military 
battle after the armed force conflict 
between AFP and MILF in 2003. It was 
realized that the clash between GRP and 
MILF after the military fighting in 2003 
has decreased although several minor 
battles still happen between GRP and 
MILF.
A. Mutually Hurting Stalemate
The experiences toward war effect 
from conflict bring both conflicting parties 
in the stuck condition or deadlock situation 
to continue the massive military fighting 
for solving the conflict. The conflicting 
parties think that they will not gain the 
benefits even become the winner in that 
conflict if they still continue the 
confrontative action. They need another 
solution which is saving them from dead 
loss and a shellacking by conducting 
peaceful settlement through negotiation. 
According to the Ripeness theory, this 
situation categorizes as Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate. In this case, GRP and MILF 
share the experience toward the effect of 
conflict and find out that they need the
different approach to settling their dispute. 
They believe that continuing the 
conflict by using military approach will 
decline each position and escalate the 
conflict in Southern Philippines more over 
both conflicting parties get pressure from 
international community and a global 
world for seeking the reconciliation toward 
Mindanao conflict. They find themselves 
no other way or approach to settling their 
dispute except that they could use peaceful 
settlement through negotiation for settling 
the Mindanao conflict. 
In the side of government and 
Philippines state, in general, the continuing 
conflict settlement by using military force 
will decline its political and economic 
stability also disturb the national security 
and national development program. More 
than 30 years Southern Philippines conflict 
has emerged and brought damage both in 
physical and physiological effect. Many 
houses are fired, public’s devices have 
broken, many civil people become 
displacements, and refuges even died. 
They lost their houses, families, children, 
wealth and opportunities life in welfare. 
On August 27, 2007, Arroyo has invited 
the MILF to conduct a peace talk regarding 
to the Basilan situation. The continuation 
of military fighting against the Moro front 
in Mindanao could harm the national 
development of the Philippines itself. 
Many populations of Mindanao becomes 
refuges and displacement since the conflict 
between GRP and the Moro front has 
erupted. Along-standing of conflict could 
decline the national income and economic 
growth of Philippines. Philippines 
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government is facing the poverty incident 
which is threatening state stability during 
the conflict. 
In battles between the MILF and the 
AFP, 30,000 internally displaced people 
(IDP) were recorded in 1997; 1,014,645 in 
2000; 24,000 in 2001; and 75,419 in 2003. 
The huge physical, social and economic 
costs of the war have in fact deepened the 
animosity and distrust among the 
contending parties as well as divisions 
among peoples along religious lines 
(Philippe Information Agency 2008).
A Huge amount of military budget 
become great effect to the economic 
development of Philippines state.  The 
resolving conflict through military force 
did not settle the conflict correctly 
otherwise, it brought the conflict difficult 
to settle and the core of problem never be 
touched. the effect of conflict has not only 
threatened the security matter but also 
threatened the national economic 
development of Philippines state as 
followed. 
The cost of the war for the inhabitants 
of the region is staggering. Consider this: 
in 1971 alone, 1,000 people died. From 
1972 to 1976, 100, 00 to 120,000 people 
were killed, 50% from the MNLF, 30% 
from the AFP and 20% of the civilian 
population. It is estimated that the cost of 
the war in the 70’s ran up to 73 billion
pesos. The 2005 UN Philippine Human 
Development Report states that, since 
1975, the conflict in Mindanao has cost 
between PHP5-10 billion yearly (Philippe 
Information Agency 2008).
…after the year 2000 war, the national 
budget of the Philippines rose from 725 
billion pesos in 2001 to 780.79 billion 
pesos in 2002, and 804.2 billion pesos in 
2003. Yet Mindanao’s share of this 
national budget declined from 13.9 per 
cent of the national budget in 2001 to 11.9 
percent in 2002. In 2003, Mindanao’s 
share was only 10.55% of the national 
budget (Russell etc, 2004). 
Philippines government also rethinks 
about its relation with international world 
toward the Mindanao conflict. There were 
possibilities that the Philippines could loss 
the investors or foreign investment who 
will invest in Philippines and Mindanao 
especially if the Mindanao conflict still 
continues by confronting military offensive 
to settle the conflict.
High Regional Diversity in the Extent of Poverty (Adriano, 2008)
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MILF has stood in a dead loss position 
after the “all-out war policy” launched by 
Estrada administration in 2001 and the 
“Buliok offensive” launched by Arroyo in 
2003 because a government has captured 
its several camps including its central 
camp. The Philippines government policy 
to cooperate with American campaign in 
“global war on terror” in 2003 has pursued 
MILF to open diplomatic offensive rather 
than the military activity for dealing with 
the government. MILF must give evidence 
to the international world that its action of 
movement does not involve as a terrorist 
organization. MILF believe that continuing 
military battle with government troops 
could make matter worse for MILF itself 
and brought MILF involve in the list of the 
foreign terrorist organization as what 
Arroyo’s wish. That could harm its 
purposes and objectives for struggle the 
Bangsamoro’s demand. Finally, MILF has 
declared that it is not a terrorist 
organization otherwise, it is pure a 
liberation movement and supporting the 
USA effort to counter terrorism and 
change its orientation of action from 
military forced to diplomatic offensive. It 
was officially stated by its previous leader, 
Salamat Hashim on June 20, 2003, as 
follows (Martin and Tuminez, 2008): 
“I hereby reiterate our condemnation and 
abhorrence of terrorist tendencies… [and] 
reject and deny any link with terrorist 
organizations or activities in this part of the 
Asia region, particularly in the Southern 
Philippines, and elsewhere in the world.” 
Murad’s statement in 2005 can be 
interpreted that any possibility form MILF 
to negotiate political solution with a 
government for settling Mindanao conflict 
when it is covering the demand of 
Bangsamoro people for the right of self-
determination and it is not just a simple 
autonomy system (Amarille, 2006). The 
MILF has realized that negotiation is the 
better approach for settling Mindanao 
conflict. It was assertively stated by Murad 
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about MILF commitment for settling the 
conflict through negotiation in 2008, as 
sounded (Kablalan, 2008):
“Let me reiterate to all including the 
international community that the MILF 
leadership is very serious and fully 
committed to resolving the conflict 
between the Bangsamoro people in 
Mindanao and the Government of Republic 
of the Philippines (GRP) through the 
current peace process.”
The pressure from the international 
world for both conflicting parties to settle 
the Mindanao conflict through peaceful 
settlement becomes the one factor that 
influenced the conflict settlement of 
Mindanao conflict through negotiation. 
The Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) has pursued the GRP and MILF to 
conduct negotiation for settling Mindanao 
conflict. It was stated in 27th ICFM 
meeting which is held in Kuala Lumpur in 
2000, as mentioned (Soliman, 2004):
“Urges the Government of Republic of the 
Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) to immediately 
halt its military hostilities and reach a 
peaceful resolution to the existing problem 
in Mindanao.”(para. 15, Resolution No. 
5/27-P) 
The pulling out of military troops of 
Malaysia as IMT has been seen as the 
threat to conflicting parties to settles their 
dispute peacefully and eventually because 
the progress of peace talk between 
Philippines government and MILF has 
turned slowly in recent progress. It was 
stated by Othman Abdul Rajak, the Chief 
Malaysian mediator, as reported (Kablalan, 
2008 p. 11): 
He said Malaysia’s decision to start 
pulling out ceasefire monitors form IMT is 
“meant to send signal” to Philippine 
authorities that they should speed up the 
effort to sign a formal peace pact with the 
MILF. 
GRP and MILF must conduct the 
negotiation in 2008 if they want to avoid 
the catastrophe situation happen in 
Mindanao Island as well as the Philippines 
as a state during their dispute toward 
Mindanao conflict. GRP and MILF must 
try their best to finish and create any 
agreement toward ancestral domain to 
implement the last aspect from the TPA in 
2001.
Mutually Enticing Opportunity 
The second causal factor that 
influenced the conflicting parties to 
conduct negotiation is encompassed in the 
concept of Mutually Enticing Opportunity 
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(MEO). Both conflicting parties realized 
that they can achieve any benefit for their 
future prospect if they agree to conduct 
negotiation for settle their dispute from 
local and international society. The impact 
of a long-standing conflict and military 
fighting between GRP and MILF has 
damaged its political and sustainable of 
economic development nationally even 
threat national security. Philippines 
government cannot stand by itself to 
recover those problems; it needs other 
parties to support its rehabilitation and 
development process on political economic 
and security matters especially on the 
affected area of conflict.
The promise of peace in Mindanao has 
opened the way for new possibilities for 
the economic development of the region by 
way of massive government financing and 
foreign assistance. The United States, 
Japan, Australia and several Islamic 
countries are among the foreign countries 
raring to pour funding into development 
projects in Mindanao (PIA Press Release, 
2006) 
Philippines government will get the 
benefit for “global war on terror” 
cooperation with USA for combating the 
terrorists’ action in the Southern 
Philippines and the Philippines in general 
by conducting peaceful settlement with 
MILF. The existing of the terrorist group 
has threatened the stability of national 
security in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the 
USA government has committed the 
support on political and financial 
assistance if both conflicting parties take 
any progress for settling their dispute
through a negotiation process. 
Bush has stated that “the United States 
will provide diplomatic and financial 
support to renewed peace process” if the 
MILF will “abandon the path of 
violence…and addresses its grievances 
through peaceful negotiations.” (Kablalan, 
2008) 
The form of cooperation between GRP 
and USA on global war on terror has 
opened the big chance for the Philippines 
in combating resistance movement who 
tend to use terrorism action and threat the 
national security. The decline of military 
budget during the battle with the Moro 
Front can be outfitted by the military aid 
from the USA. The development aid from 
American government also allocated for 
the sustainable development of peace 
processes with MILF on the implantation 
of ceasefire agreement. 
Actually, American government has 
no direct role in the peace processes 
between Philippines government and 
MILF although President Bush has the 
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commitment to give its support for 
reconciliation process of Mindanao 
conflict. The US government gives its 
respect toward the existing of Malaysia as 
the main actor as the mediator on the peace 
processes between GRP and MILF. The 
US State Department engaged with the 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and 
the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) for facilitating the 
peace talk processes between GRP and 
MILF and to assist the national 
development on social-economic sectors. 
“Beyond helping to track and kill 
terrorists, Washington has promoted 
economic development in the region and 
has tried to assist in settling local conflicts 
that very often have taken on an Islamic 
cast. In the southern Philippines, the US 
has built new classrooms, medical clinics, 
roads, wells, and other social-welfare 
projects, spending over $250 million in aid 
since 2001.” [Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 30 May, 2007] 
In addition to the now $260 million 
provided for “development aid” in the last 
6 years, the United States gave the 
Philippines $250 million in military aid 
between 2002 and 2006, equivalent to 10% 
of the military budget. Between October 
2007 and September 2008 alone, the 
United States provided the Philippines 
with almost $30 million in financing for 
military equipment (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 30 May, 2007) 
GRP and MILF also enjoy the foreign aid 
from Japanese government in conducting 
peaceful settlement through negotiation 
processes as reported: 
An amount of $1,981,337 came from 
the Japanese government through JICA as 
well as from the Japanese sector. Direct 
Japanese assistance to the GRP-MILF 
Peace Process has been pouring in. 
(Solomon, 2007)
Table 1
Donor Assistance toward Mindanao Peace Processes in 2005-2012
Donor Work Agency
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Mindanao Trust Fund for 
Reconstruction and 
Development Program 
(MTF-RDP)
Multi-donor trust fund 
provided by Australia, 
Canada, European 
Union, etc
ARMM Social Fund Project 
(AFSP)
The National 
Government
Mindanao Rural 
Development Project 2 
(MRDP 2)
World Bank
UN Act for Peace Program
Australian, New Zealand 
and Spain
Japan-Bangsamoro 
Initiatives for 
Reconstruction and 
Development Project (J-
BIRD)
Japan
The development of peace 
processes
Canadian International 
Development Agency 
(CIDA)
Growth with Equity in 
Mindanao 3 (GEM 3)
USAID
Source: Mindanao Update No.2 September 2007 (World Bank, 2007)
The Australia government has to give 
development aid through AusAID which is 
concerned with the Mindanao peace 
process and joined on the World Bank’s 
multi-donor fund for Mindanao. In 2006, 
Australia government has launched around 
US$50 million in Cotabato city. 
The British government has also 
committed to giving its help toward peace 
talk processes between Philippines 
government and MILF. British government 
will send its expert for giving the 
assistance and advice during peace talk 
between GRP and MILF as reported 
(World Bank, 2007):
The United Kingdom said yesterday 
that the Philippine and British 
governments agreed that experts in the 
Northern Ireland peace process will be sent 
to the Philippines to give assistance and 
advice to the peace talks between the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the 
government. 
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The existing of Mindanao Trust Fund 
(MTF) mechanism through reconstruction 
effort and development program of a 
conflict-affected area in Mindanao 
engaged with BDA give the contribution to 
promoting peace processes between 
Philippines government and MILF. 
Total donor contributions deposited in 
the MTF Program account as of December 
31, 2007, amounted to about USD 6 
million coming from Australia, Canada, 
the European Commission, New Zealand, 
Sweden, and the World Bank. Funds from 
USAID and the second contribution from 
EC will be included in next year’s MTF 
account (Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, 2007). 
Besides that, several Islamic states and 
Islamic Organizations have a strong
commitment to supporting the processes of 
peace talk and reconciliation of Mindanao 
conflict. Malaysia and Libya have 
significant contribution toward the 
reconciliation processes between GRP and 
MILF. Media has been reported that Saudi 
Arabia government has delivered its 
financial aid for rehabilitation and 
development project as follows: Sultan 
Kuadrat Gov. Pax Mangudadatu said the 
government of Saudi Arabia had already 
approved the release of $100 million for 
Mindanao infrastructure projects and 
rehabilitation of the MILF’s Camp Abu 
Bakar (Philsol, 2010). 
The Iranian government announced its 
readiness and commitment to support the 
peace processes between GRP and MILF. 
The development assistance will focus on 
the monitoring of ceasefire and various 
humanitarian project which is concerning 
for the reducing poverty in the Southern 
Philippines.
Table 2
Foreign Aid for Mindanao Project (Padilla, 2004)
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Indeed, MILF re-think that continuing 
the military fighting with Philippines 
government will harm its image and its 
main purpose to reach better life for 
Bangsamoro people. The continuation 
armed force will justify the existing ties 
between MILF and terrorist movements 
and loss the support from foreign Islamic 
states and international communities. 
According to Taya (2007), MILF wants to 
continue peace talk with Philippines 
government because it tries to avoid the 
political isolation from the international 
community. She states that the political 
isolation from the international community 
will damage the MILF’s image and its 
credibility as a liberation movement.
152 Fajriyah Nurkhasanah Taufik | DAULIYAH Journal
Conclusion
The failure of implementation the FPA 
1996 has offered the new change for MLF 
become a legal representative from 
Bangsamoro. GRP and MILF enhanced the 
peace talk for solve the Mindanao conflict. 
Arroyo has invited the MILF for resuming 
the peace talk and resulting the Tripoli 
Agreement on Peace in 2001 that cover 
three major points of issues about security 
(ceasefire mechanism), humanitarian 
rehabilitation and development, and 
ancestral domain aspect. The two of three 
aspects from Tripoli Agreement on Peace 
has been implemented by the declaration 
of the implementing guidelines on security 
and humanitarian development aspect in 
2001 and 2002. The processes of peace 
talk between GRP and MILF stalled again 
after the “Buliok Offensive” action in 2003 
from AFP under the command of 
Philippines government to attack the base 
camp of MILF and the proposal of GRP to 
USA for including the MILF in the list of 
the terrorist movement. Nevertheless, these 
actions did not give any benefit for both 
conflicting parties. Their armed conflict 
brought into the worse condition that threat 
the Philippines national stability both in 
politics and social-economic spheres and 
national security aspect. The experienced
of the major battle in 2000 and 2003 
pursued both conflicting parties to find 
another approach to settle their dispute 
except military offensive. GRP and MILF 
used negotiation tactics for settle their 
dispute although there were the stronger 
hawkish groups within each party who are 
opposing the processes of peace talk 
moreover in the recent peace talk of MOA-
AD since the late of 2003 until 2008. 
According to ripeness theory, there are 
two concepts that can be used for 
analyzing the causal factors of GRP-MILF 
initiative for conducting peaceful 
settlement toward Mindanao conflict in 
2008. Mutually Hurting Stalemate as the 
first concept explaining that GRP and 
MILF had realized through cost and 
benefit calculation the escalating of 
conflict by armed forced only give the 
dead loss position for them. It was 
supported by the fact that the continuation 
military fighting could decline the politics 
and social-economic development and 
threat the national security. The pressure 
from local and international societies 
becomes the consideration of both 
conflicting parties to settle Mindanao 
conflict peacefully. The recent of world 
order that concern on the peaceful world 
has pursued GRP and MILF to conduct 
peaceful settlement toward Mindanao 
Conflict. The continuation of armed battle 
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with Muslim rebel could harm the position 
of Arroyo and decline her legitimacy. 
Arroyo also must prevent the potential 
conflict with Malaysia toward refugees and 
territorial dispute within the Mindanao 
Conflict. In the other side, the global war 
on terror cooperation between GRP and the 
American government has been pressuring 
MILF to open diplomatic offensive and 
resume the peace talk with Philippines 
government. Moreover, the almost Islamic 
resistance movement is assumed and 
closed relation with terrorism action, MILF 
must think deeper about its position. 
The second causal factor for both 
conflicting parties to conduct the 
negotiation stage is talking about the 
Mutually Enticing Opportunity that will be 
reached by both conflicting parties if they 
want to go to the negotiation. The foreign 
states and both local and international 
community’s give their strong commitment 
to promoting the peace processes on 
Mindanao conflict when the GRP and 
MILF continue the peace talk processes for 
solving the Mindanao conflict. Malaysia 
through its role as leader of International 
Monitoring Team engage with its member 
has facilitated the ceasefire monitoring 
between GRP and MILF. It has been 
followed by foreign states such as USA, 
Japan, New Zeeland, England, Sweden, 
Australia and other states.  GRP and MILF 
received development assistance toward 
social-economic and security matter from 
foreign states and from any organization 
both IGOs and NGOs as well as World 
Bank, OIC, the Amnesty International etc 
when they conduct negotiation for 2008 
and create the peaceful condition in 
Mindanao Island and the Philippines as the 
whole.
Indeed, it is still far from success to 
solve the conflict. At least, both conflicting 
parties performed the willing to prevent the 
catastrophe situation at that time. Recent 
development has proven that Mindanao 
conflict cannot be eased to be solved.
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